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Abstract: In 1997, the U.S. Treasury introduced Inflation Protection (or “Indexed ”) Securities, known as TIPS. 
Several authors have since described these securities as “tax disadvantaged” relative to conventional securities, 
leading to substantial debate regarding their appropriateness outside of tax-deferred accounts. In this paper, the 
authors develop a framework that allows them to demonstrate that the tax treatment of TIPS is trivially 
different from that of conventional Treasury securities. Utilizing an after-tax valuation approach, they further 
show that under relatively conservative projections for inflation, TIPS generally have after-tax yields 
comparable to, if not exceeding, conventional fixed-rate Treasury securities. Moreover, the authors find 
evidence that since their introduction, TIPS have outperformed matched maturity conventional Treasury 
securities in terms of after-tax returns. 
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  In January 1997 the U.S. Treasury followed the lead of several other countries and began 
auctioning inflation-indexed debt in the form of Treasury Inflation Protection (or ￿Indexed￿) 
Securities, commonly referred to as TIPS.  Unlike the Treasury￿s conventional debt, these 
indexed debt securities have a fixed real coupon rate.  Because the principal is adjusted (semi-
annually) by the amount of inflation over the period, nominal coupon payments, equal to the 
product of the real coupon rate and the inflation-adjusted principal, grow with inflation.  By 
design, these securities provide a hedge against inflation, and the real yield (equal to the real 
coupon rate) is essentially constant and established at issuance.  
  The finance profession has alternated between totally ignoring the tax treatment of these 
new instruments on the one hand to arguing that the tax treatment of these instruments is so 
unique and disadvantageous to make these unworthy of taxable investors attention.   A number 
of studies demonstrate that inflation-indexed debt can be a beneficial component of most 
portfolios (e.g., Bodie [1990], Campbell and Viceira [2002], and Campbell et al. [2003]).  
Without considering the tax treatment of these instruments these studies imply that TIPS do not 
have any unique tax considerations.  Similarly, Jarrow and Yildirim [2003] use an arbitrage-free 
term structure model to fit the time series of real and nominal zero-coupon bond prices, without a 
tax factor. This again suggests that these authors see little in the tax treatment of TIPS to make 
them different from nominal Treasury securities.  1
  Others, however, emphasize the unique tax treatment placed upon TIPS as critical in 
interpreting these instruments.
1 Essentially, taxes must be paid annually on accrued increase in 
principal caused by inflation, even when this is an unrealized gain.  Therefore, the owner is 
required to pay taxes on ￿phantom income￿ that is not actually received until maturity or upon 
sale of the bond.  This tax treatment has led several leading authorities in the field to characterize 
TIPS as ￿tax disadvantaged.￿  See, for example, Fabozzi [2000], Van Horne [2001], and 
Sundaresan [2002] who all argue that TIPS have serious tax disadvantages.
2   
  The conclusion that TIPS are seriously tax disadvantaged has spilled into the popular 
press as well.  For example, in a recent issue of Money magazine, Rekenthaler [2003, p.44] 
writes  ￿[The tax treatment] is annoying . . . therefore, TIPS are best held in a tax-deferred 
account.￿ Clements [2003], in the Wall Street Journal, quotes an investment advisor, Nelson 
Lam, as stating, ￿These things [TIPS] are horribly tax inefficient.￿ 
  In this paper, we evaluate the notion that TIPS are tax disadvantaged.  We argue that the 
tax treatment of TIPS needs to be compared with the tax treatment of non-inflation indexed 
securities, rather than in isolation.  Our analysis suggests that, under fairly common assumptions, 
these instruments are not tax disadvantaged relative to conventional Treasury debt.  We argue 
that the annual taxation of accretion of principal is necessary to make the overall taxation of 
TIPS comparable to conventional debt.  We then examine the empirical performance of TIPS 
from a couple of different perspectives.  Consistent with our contention, we find empirical 
evidence that the after-tax yields on TIPS and conventional bonds are close to one another when 
inflation expectations are taken from the two markets.  We also examine the holding period 
returns for TIPS and compare these to the holding period returns on conventional Treasury 
                                                 
1 Parker and Vines [2003] provide details on the tax treatment of TIPS, as specified by the Internal Revenue Service.   2
securities, both on an after-tax basis. Interestingly, we find that TIPS outperform their 
conventional counterparts, even assuming investors are in high marginal tax brackets. An 
important implication of the study is that, contrary to views widely expressed in the academic 
and practitioner communities, the appeal of TIPS should not be viewed as limited to tax-exempt 
investors. 
TAX COMPARISONS FOR ONE-PERIOD SECURITIES SELLING AT PAR 
  It is relatively straightforward to compare the ex post performance of TIPS with 
conventional Treasury debt on a before-tax basis.  The Fisher hypothesis suggests that the 
nominal yield on conventional debt will compensate for anticipated inflation, thereby providing 
an acceptable real yield.   Assuming that the expected real yield on TIPS equals the expected real 
yield on (otherwise-similar) conventional debt, the difference between the two quoted yields will 
reflect expected inflation.  If the debt is purchased at par, expected inflation will also be reflected 
by the difference in the coupon rates.  In fact, this was one of the arguments put forward as to 
why these instruments will be beneficial; they will provide indirect evidence on expected 
inflation.  Now, when realized inflation exceeds (is below) expected inflation, the realized real 
return on fixed-rate debt will be below (above) the expected real yield.  Since the real yield on 
TIPS is established at issuance, unanticipated inflation  causes TIPS to outperform their nominal 
counterparts on a real before-tax basis.  Just the opposite occurs when there is unanticipated 
disinflation or deflation.   
  To simplify the after-tax comparison of the ex post performance of TIPS and 
conventional securities, we begin by assuming that a one-period bond is purchased at par.  The 
real after-tax return on fixed-rate (FR) debt can then be represented as: 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Kopeke and Kimball [1999] suggest TIPS might be attractive for high-income individuals, contrary to these 
authors.  3
                                                                rFR = CFR (1 ￿ T) ￿ π ,                                                     (1) 
where  
 r FR is the real after-tax return on fixed-rate debt,  
 C FR is the nominal coupon rate,  
  T is the ordinary income tax rate, and  
  π  is the realized inflation rate.   
In a similar manner, the real after-tax return on one-period TIPS can be represented as: 
                                                       rTIPS = CN, TIPS (1 ￿ T) ￿ (π )(T),                                            (2) 
where  
 r TIPS is the real after-tax return on TIPS,  
 C N, TIPS is the nominal coupon rate = (C0)(1 + π), and C0 is the constant real coupon rate 
  T the ordinary income tax rate,  
  π  is the realized inflation rate, and  
 ( π )(T) is the tax per $1 par value due to inflation.   
 An important implication of this simple comparison is that there is no difference in the tax 
treatment of the two bonds under zero inflation, if the two instruments have the same coupon 
rates.  This suggests that at least in this environment TIPS are most tax-disadvantaged. 
  What about the case of positive expected inflation?  If we again invoke the Fisher 
relationship, and assume that inflation is perfectly forecastable, then the difference in the 
conventional coupon rate and the TIPS coupon rate perfectly reflects future inflation (ignoring 
the cross-product term): 
                                                                     CFR ￿ C0 = π.                                                        (3)  4
Under this scenario, equations (1) and (2) can be used to show that rFR = rTIPS.  That is, again, the 
real after-tax yields on the two securities should be identical. Thus, the difference in tax 
treatment does not (in this simple one-period example) lead to a perverse or altered relationship 
between the two bonds￿ yields when inflation is correctly reflected by the difference in the 
coupon rates.  This analysis suggests that the difference in before-tax yields reflects the inflation 
expectations and the taxation of the inflation component when the real after-tax yields are equal. 
This analysis further illustrates that the tax treatment of TIPS is not different from that of 
conventional Treasury securities, even in the face of inflation. 
  An alternative view of the relationship between the tax treatments and the after-tax real 
yields across the two bonds is provided by rewriting equation (1) to explicitly allow for 
expectations in the Fisher hypothesis (again ignoring the cross-product term).  For fixed rate 
bonds, we have: 
                                                 rFR = [E(CR,FR) + E(π )] (1 ￿ T) ￿ π ,                                            (4) 
where E( ) is the expectation operator, CR,FR is the real coupon rate on the fixed-rate bond, and 
all other variables are as previously defined.  By setting the after-tax real return on TIPS equal to 
the after-tax real return on fixed-rate debt (i.e., by setting equation (2) equal to equation (4)), the 
following relationship results: 
                                                      CN, TIPS + π  =  E(CR,FR) + E(π ).                                              (5) 
Equation (5) again demonstrates that the different tax treatment across the two bonds does not 
influence the equilibration of their real, after-tax yields.  Instead, the after-tax real yields will be 
equal when the sum of the TIPS coupon and actual inflation equals the sum of the expected real 
fixed-rate coupon and expected inflation. Thus, a taxable investment account would receive no 
less benefit from holding TIPS as opposed to a fixed-rate debt.  5
  From equations (1) and (2), we also know that an unanticipated increase in inflation will 
lead to a reduction in the real after-tax return on TIPS by (π )(T), which is less than the reduction 
in the real after-tax return on fixed-rate debt, equal to π .  Thus, like the before-tax scenario, TIPS 
will outperform fixed-rate debt on a real after-tax basis if actual inflation is higher than expected 
inflation. 
  Having established under the Fisherian framework that the tax treatment of TIPS does not 
cause them to be ￿disadvantaged￿ relative to conventional securities for a taxable investor, we 
next examine the logic that has been used to establish the view that TIPS are tax disadvantaged. 
A good point of departure is Clements￿ [2003] simple analysis. He establishes the claimed tax 
difficulties with an example: ￿Suppose you are in the 35% income tax bracket and you buy 10-
year inflation bonds with a 2.3% real yield. If inflation runs at 4.7% over the next decade, you 
will clock a nominal gain of 7%. But after you surrender 35% of that gain to the taxman, you 
will be left with less than 4.6%, below the 4.7% inflation rate.￿ 
  At one level Clements is exactly correct in his calculations. The TIPS would indeed have 
a negative after-tax real return in this setting; however, Clements does not consider any other 
alternatives. Suppose the above investor chooses the conventional security, as opposed to the 
TIPS. If we assume that the expectations of inflation are realistic, then the nominal yield on the 
conventional security should be 7% under our Fisherian assumptions (2.3% real return plus 4.7% 
compensation for expected inflation, ignoring any cross-product term). Our hypothetical 
conventional security investor would be required to surrender 35% of the annual nominal yield 
for tax purposes, so he/she would again be left with the same after-tax yield of 4.55%. In other 
words, as just shown above, the TIPS would be no more tax disadvantaged in this situation than  6
the nominal Treasury securities, as the conventional level would also have negative real after tax 
returns.  
  It is indeed the case that as inflation rises, along with expectations for future inflation, our 
tax code makes debt holders worse off, if nominal rates rise one for one with expected inflation. 
Indeed, Darby [1975] and Feldstein￿s [1976] main point was that investors understand the 
taxation on inflation and therefore cause nominal rates to rise faster (by 1/(1-T)) than increases in 
expected inflation.   But our central point is that as long as we can assume that nominal yields 
reflect future expected inflation one for one, as the Fisherian framework requires, TIPS are no 
more disadvantaged than conventional securities. If TIPS￿ unrealized capital gains were not 
taxed then they would, in a tax sense,  entirely dominate conventional Treasury securities, since 
the latter would still have nominal capital gains taxed. The IRS ruling on TIPS assures that TIPS 
and conventional Treasury securities are essentially taxed similarly. 
  
NEGATIVE NET CASH FLOWS WITH TIPS 
  In this section we address the possible ￿disadvantage￿ that occurs when the annual tax 
obligation on phantom income from the inflation-adjusted principal on TIPS is greater than the 
after-tax cash flow from the coupons received in that year.  Some have suggested that the 
possibility of a negative net cash flow in any particular year represents an important piece of the 
tax disadvantage argument (e.g., see Sundaresan [2002]).  We can easily model the after-tax 
coupon payment on TIPS, and the tax obligation on the increase in inflation-adjusted principal 
on TIPS, as 
                                                           CAT = C(1 ￿ T),                                                                (6) 
                                                             TOB = (π )(T),                                                                (7)  7
where 
 C AT is the after-tax nominal coupon payment, 
  C is the before-tax nominal coupon payment, 
  T is the ordinary income tax rate, 
  π  is the inflation rate, and  
  TOB is the tax obligation per dollar increase in principal due to inflation. 
  It is clear from equations (6) and (7) that the net cash flow, CA-T ￿ TOB, is smaller: 1) the 
higher the inflation rate, 2) the higher the tax rate, or 3) the lower the coupon rate.  Tables 1 and 
2 present the net cash flow at varying levels of the tax rate (20%, 30%, and 40%), and varying 
levels of nominal coupon rates (1% and 3%), for 3% and 5% inflation, respectively.  The entries 
show that small negative cash flows occur at the low nominal coupon rate of 1% for tax rates of 
30% and 40%.  However, at the more reasonable coupon rate of 3%, no tax rates lead to negative 
cash flows when inflation is 3%, and only small negative flows occur at T = 40% when inflation 
is 5%.  These data suggest that the likelihood of negative net cash flows, at reasonable 
parameters for today￿s environment, is relatively low.  Furthermore, for those parameter values 
with a negative net cash flow, the amounts are relatively small. 
  When considering the role of negative net cash flows in the tax disadvantage argument, it 
is important to recognize that nominal coupon rates on fixed-rate debt are directly related to 
expected inflation (i.e., issuers typically issue debt near par value) if, as we presume, the Fisher 
effect holds.  Therefore, since nominal coupons on fixed-rate debt are taxed, higher inflation 
leads to an increase in ￿inflation taxation.￿  Furthermore, fixed-rate debt holders face the 
potential of a capital loss if an increase in inflation is unanticipated.  Both of these factors will  8
reduce the after-tax return for fixed-rate debt holders.  These can be taken as additional factors 
that abate any perceived tax disadvantage. 
 
TAX COMPARISONS FOR MULTI-PERIOD SECURITIES  
  In this section we show how one can directly compare TIPS and conventional Treasury 
securities on an after-tax basis in a multi-period setting.  We use an after-tax nominal yield 
comparison because these are easily calculated and directly observable for conventional 
securities.  Van Horne [2001] carefully details the manner in which taxes affect yields of 
conventional fixed rate instruments.  To find after-tax nominal yields, Van Horne solves for the 
discount rate that will equate today’s security price with the present value of all nominal, after-
tax cash flows.  For a conventional fixed-rate bond that is held to maturity, Van Horne provides 
the following: 
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where 
  C is the annual (nominal) coupon payment, 
  T is the ordinary income tax rate, 
  G is the capital gains tax rate, 
  N is the number of years to maturity,  
 P FR is today￿s price ($1 par value),  
 P 0 is the original purchase price ($1 par value), and 
 R FR is the nominal, after-tax yield that equates the above relationship. 
  9
  Equation (8) illustrates the calculation of after-tax nominal yields for conventional 
securities.  The right-hand side of the equation can be interpreted as the present value of all after-
tax nominal cash flows discounted by the after-tax nominal yield that provides the bond￿s price.  
The first term represents the present value of all after-tax coupon payments.  The second term 
represents the present value of the after-tax capital gain (loss).  The last term represents the 
present value of the purchase price, which bears no tax obligation. 
  Now consider Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, TIPS.  Define pA,t to be the 
inflation-adjusted principal on a TIPS at time t.  This can be written as pA,t = pA,t-1 (1 + πt), where 
πt = the inflation rate (i.e., πt = CPIt/CPIt-1 ￿ 1),
3 and pA,0 is par at issuance.  As long as one 
knows the CPI index for different points in time, the new accrued principal can be found.  For 
the sake of simplifying the discussion at this point, we ignore the complication that going 
forward one does not know with certainty the future course of the CPI, and instead assume that 
future inflation equals anticipated inflation.  This is highly unrealistic, but investors must ask 
themselves what future inflation will bring when they are estimating nominal yields on TIPS. 
  Following Van Horne￿s [2001] development, we can solve for the nominal, after-tax 
yield for TIPS by equating today’s TIPS price, PTIPS, with the present value of all nominal after-
tax cash flows: 
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where 
 C t is the time t nominal coupon payment; Ct = (C0)pA, t; C0 is the constant real coupon rate,   
  T is the ordinary income tax rate, 
  N is the number of years to maturity,  10
 P TIPS is today￿s price,  
pA,t is the inflation-adjusted principal on a TIPS at time t,  pA,t = pA,t-1 (1 + πt) as defined 
above, and 
 R TIPS is the nominal, after-tax yield that equates the above relationship. 
  The right-hand side of equation (9) can be interpreted as the present value of all after-tax 
cash flows discounted by the after-tax nominal yield that provides the bond￿s price, assuming 
some pattern of future inflation.  The first term on the right-hand-side is simply the present value 
of the after-tax nominal coupon payments.  The second term represents tax obligations on 
phantom income due to the inflation adjustment on the principal, and therefore carries a negative 
sign.
4  Finally, the third term is the present value of the inflation-adjusted principal at maturity.  
Since the increase in the principal is taxed annually, there is no additional tax obligation 
associated with this last payment. 
  As discussed above, it is the taxation of the phantom income that leads some to suggest 
that TIPS are tax disadvantaged.  Equations (8) and (9), however, allow us to make two 
important points about this contention.  First, the coupon payment for the conventional Treasury 
security, C, in the first term of equation (8), is a nominal cash flow that investors expect will 
compensate them for inflation via the Fisher hypothesis (and potentially for the taxation of 
inflation under the Darby and Feldstein framework).  Therefore, if participants anticipate higher 
future inflation, C contains a greater inflation ￿mark-up,￿ which also results in higher nominal 
taxes.  Since taxes on C must be paid annually, the tax treatment of fixed-rate debt securities also 
requires that taxes be paid annually on an ￿inflation component.￿  Since the coupon rate on 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 Here we ignore a slight two-month lag in the inflation adjustment calculation that TIPS require. 
4 To the extent that there is no capital gains tax rate applied to increases in inflation-adjusted principal for TIPS, 
equation (9) might suggest a slight tax disadvantage in comparison to the after-tax yield of fixed-rate Treasury 
securities as described in equation (8).  We provide empirical evidence below that this difference is minimal.  11
conventional, fixed-rate debt should be greater than the coupon rate on TIPS (by approximately 
E(π)  under the Fisher hypothesis, and by approximately E(π )/(1-T) under the Darby and 
Feldstein framework), the taxes paid every year on coupons over the life of the securities are, at a 
minimum, greater by E(π )(T) on fixed-rate debt than the annual taxes on TIPS.  This again 
suggests no tax disadvantage on TIPS.  The inference in the single period analysis generalizes to 
the multi-period setting. 
  The second important point to consider for TIPS is that the annual taxation of phantom 
cash flows is offset by the inflation-induced gain in principal that is not taxed at maturity.  Thus, 
there is no new net increase in tax obligations due to inflation for TIPS versus fixed-rate debt.  It 
is simply that the tax obligation of the inflation ￿mark-up￿ comes annually, as opposed to at 
maturity, as bondholders would naturally prefer.  This treatment (as shown above), however, is 
not different from the annual taxation of the mark-up in the coupon for fixed-rate debt. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: AFTER-TAX YIELD COMPARISONS 
  The inferences in the multi-period setting are predicated on the well-known Fisher 
hypothesis, in which nominal rates will move one-for-one with changes in expected inflation.  
However, the literature contains substantial controversy about the hypothesis, stemming largely 
from empirical investigations.  Indeed, the theoretical frameworks of Mundell and Tobin, and 
Darby and Feldstein-Feldstein, also find support.  Therefore, we believe investigating whether 
market data for Treasury securities supports the notions laid out earlier provides an important 
contribution. 
  In our effort to more explicitly quantify the tax difference between TIPS and 
conventional securities, we use equations (8) and (9) to calculate after-tax nominal yields for a  12
matched sample of conventional Treasury securities and TIPS, respectively.  We began with all 
TIPS in existence at the end of 2002.  At this time, ten TIPS issues existed, with different 
maturities.  For each TIPS security, we then selected a maturity-date-matched/issuance-date-
matched conventional Treasury security.  Prices, coupon rates, and accrued principal on 
November 26, 2002 were taken from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ).  Table 3 provides 
information on each of these securities (ordered by issuance date).   
  Consider the matched pair at the bottom of Table 3 maturing in July and August of 2012.  
Both securities had been recently issued and were selling reasonably close to par.  The July 2012 
TIPS has a stated coupon rate of 3.00% and the WSJ listed the yield to maturity as 2.53% with 
accrued principal 1008 ($1000 face).  The August 2012 conventional Treasury note had a coupon 
rate of 4.375% and the WSJ listed the yield to maturity at 4.18%. 
  Of course, TIPS compensate the investor for future inflation as it occurs.  Future inflation 
is uncertain, but as indicated above, to calculate an after-tax nominal yield for TIPS using 
equation (9), we must make an assumption about future inflation.  We use the fixed-income 
markets to guide us in estimating future inflation.  As developed above, the difference in the 
coupon rates (conventional coupon rate less TIPS coupon rate) should as a first approximation 
reflect the market’s expectation of future inflation.  Thus, for the July/August 2012 matched pair, 
annual inflation was assumed to be 1.375% for the next ten years.  We also assumed that all 
nominal income was taxed at the ordinary income tax rate of 34 percent, and capital gains are 
taxed at 20 percent.
5  With these assumptions, and the security prices from the WSJ, we have all 
of the necessary elements to solve for RFR in equation (8) and RTIPS in equation (9).  The use of 
                                                 
5 The overall implications of the findings remained the same with several alternative tax rates.  13
expected inflation, as we measure it, allows us to characterize the after-tax nominal yields as 
expected after-tax yields.
6 
  Table 4 provides the details of the after-tax nominal yields for all TIPS securities in 
existence at the end of 2002 (ordered by maturity date) along with the after-tax nominal yields 
for matched conventional Treasury securities.  We see that the after-tax nominal yield on the 
conventional Treasury security is higher than the after-tax nominal yield on the matched TIPS in 
six out of the ten pairs, with an average yield spread of 0.33%.  In the four remaining matched 
pairs, however, the TIPS after-tax yield is higher, on average, by 0.515%.  This average is 
heavily influenced by the large yield spread for the January 2007/October 2006-maturity pair, 
and without this pair the average spread is 0.23%.   
  As a reminder, the calculations incorporate the TIPS ￿tax disadvantage,￿ as the TIPS 
investor is required to pay taxes on phantom income.  Yet, as this Table illustrates, there is not a 
consistent, sizable difference in the after-tax nominal yields on TIPS versus their fixed-rate 
counterparts.  These results suggest that either the tax disadvantage is not greatly consequential, 
or TIPS are being priced in the market so as to reduce the importance of the tax treatment in such 
a way that anticipated after-tax yields are not substantially different across the two security 
classes.  The evidence in the Table also suggests the possibility of some maturity/tax clientele 
effects.  TIPS have the higher after-tax nominal yields for maturities of seven years or less, and 
conventional instruments have higher expected after-tax nominal yields for longer maturities.  
The fact that the after-tax yield difference (FR less TIPS) widens with maturity is consistent with 
fixed-rate investors demanding higher nominal yields to compensate for a greater inflation risk 
premium, which TIPS investors need not be concerned about.    
                                                 
6 Hereafter, we refer to expected yields simply as yields.  14
  We present in Table 5 the inflation rate that equates the after-tax nominal yield on each 
TIPS with the after-tax nominal yield on the matched fixed-rate security (presented in Table 4).  
All calculations again use equations (8) or (9) and again assume a marginal ordinary income tax 
rate of 34% and a capital gains tax rate of 20%.  Inflation rates above (below) this critical rate 
will result in the TIPS having a higher (lower) after-tax nominal yield than its fixed-rate 
counterpart.  Therefore, it is informative to view the variation (or lack thereof) in the rates across 
the maturity spectrum.   
  We see from the evidence in Table 5 that there is relatively little variation in the critical 
inflation rates across the maturities.  There is, however, a (near) monotonic increase in the 
critical rates with the lengthening of maturity.  This is consistent with the evidence in Table 4 
which shows an increasing yield spread (conventional fixed rate less TIPS) as maturity 
lengthens, which we link to the relationship between maturity and inflation risk premiums. 
  To return to our main point, the evidence in Table 5 indicates that the only way investors 
could currently view TIPS as being seriously tax disadvantaged would be if they were 
anticipating inflation rates to consistently remain below 2.5%.  For those that anticipate inflation 
to be at or above this level in the foreseeable future, TIPS can be expected to provide after-tax 
returns as high as those on comparable conventional Treasury securities. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: EX-POST HOLDING PERIOD RETURNS 
  Since these prior evaluations rely on inflation projections, explicitly or implicitly, to 
compare after-tax yields on TIPS versus conventional Treasury securities, we also calculated ex 
post holding period returns from issuance dates until early 2003 for a sub-sample of our matched 
pairs of securities.  This backward looking analysis does not require any assumptions about  15
future inflation.  However, if TIPS are indeed tax disadvantaged their ex-post holding period 
returns should be less than that of conventional Treasury securities.  Table 6 provides the annual 
after-tax holding period returns for the four maturity-date-matched pairs that mature in January 
or February.  These four pairs were selected because of the close proximity of their respective 
maturity dates (i.e., only one month apart).  The calculations were made using price data as of 
early 2003, a tax rate equal to 34%, and the actual reference inflation rates since issuance (for the 
TIPS).   
  It is clear that for each of these matched-pairs, TIPS have provided higher after-tax 
returns than their matched-sample conventional Treasury securities, with the difference getting 
larger for the more recently issued matched-pairs.  The overall evidence indicates that even 
investors with 34% marginal tax rates would have been better off buying the TIPS at issuance, as 
opposed to the conventional Treasury security issued about the same time. Recognize also that 
inflation was basically the same for any of these four matched-pairs, so that TIPS would also 
have higher after-tax real returns, as well. An important caveat to consider when looking at these 
results is that changes in the relative levels of the real and nominal interest rate over time could 
have been an important source of these return differences.  Nonetheless, over the recent period of 
relatively stable inflation, all four TIPS issuances that are very closely issuance-date-matched 
and maturity-date-matched have fared well on an after-tax basis compared to similar 
conventional Treasury securities.  This again suggests that the tax treatment of TIPS is not as 
severe as suggested by many. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS   16
  The U.S. Treasury began issuing inflation indexed (or ￿protection￿) securities in 1997.  
Primarily because of their well-established benefit as an inflation hedge, several studies have 
concluded that TIPS can be an important component of most investment portfolios (e.g., see 
Campbell, et al. (2003)).  Contrary to this view, others have argued that TIPS are ￿tax 
disadvantaged,￿ and therefore should not be considered for taxable accounts because they are 
inferior to conventional securities on an after-tax basis.   
  In this paper, we reexamine the tax treatments on TIPS and conventional debt in a 
Fisherian framework. Our framework allows us to conclude that a tax disadvantage, at least 
relative to other Treasury securities.  In fact, we argue the tax treatments are not greatly 
dissimilar. Our empirical results support this notion. We provide empirical evidence that a 
sizable proportion of outstanding TIPS have higher expected after-tax nominal yields than their 
conventional Treasury counterparts.  Moreover, we also find that after-tax returns have been 
higher for TIPS than their matched maturity conventional Treasury security counterparts since 
the introduction of the former securities.  Our evidence further suggests that previous work 
considering the portfolio benefits of TIPS and/or the pricing of TIPS need not be revisited 
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TABLE 1 
Net Cash Flows (per $1000 Par Value) on TIPS: After-Tax Coupon  
Payment Minus the Tax Obligation on the Increase in Inflation-Adjusted  
Principal, at 3% Inflation 
    
      20% Tax  30% Tax  40% Tax       
   1%  CT  +$2 -$2  -$6 
   3%  CT +$18  +$12  +$6 
    
CT is the before-tax nominal coupon payment on  






    
TABLE 2 
Net Cash Flows (per $1000 Par Value) on TIPS: After-Tax Coupon  
Payment Minus the Tax Obligation on the Increase in Inflation-Adjusted  
Principal, at 5% Inflation 
     
      20% Tax  30% Tax  40% Tax       
   1%  CT -$2  -$8  -$14 
   3%  CT +$14  +$6  -$2 
    
CT is the before-tax nominal coupon payment on  
TIPS, and Tax is the ordinary income tax rate. 
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TABLE 3  
Information on Ten Outstanding TIPS and Matched Conventional Fixed-Rate Treasury Securities 
  Issuance      Reference CPI at 
Instrument  Date     Maturity  Coupon Rate   TIPS Issuance   
TIPS  January 1997*  January 2007  3.375%  158.43548 
Conventional  October 1996  October 2006  6.500%   
 
TIPS  January 1998  January 2008  3.625%  161.55484 
Conventional  February 1998  February 2008  5.500% 
 
TIPS  April 1998  April 2028  3.625%  161.74000 
Conventional  August 1998  August 2028  5.500%   
 
TIPS  January 1999  January 2009  3.875%  164.00000 
Conventional  May 1999  May 2009  5.500%   
 
TIPS  April 1999  April 2029  3.875%  164.39333 
Conventional  February 1999  February 2029  5.250%   
 
TIPS  January 2000*  January 2010  4.250%  168.24516 
Conventional  February 2000  February 2010  6.500% 
 
TIPS  January 2001*  January 2011  3.500%  174.04516 
Conventional  February 2001  February 2011  5.000% 
 
TIPS  October 2001  April 2032  3.375%  177.50000 
Conventional  February 2001  February 2031  5.375% 
 
TIPS  January 2002  January 2012  3.375%  177.56452 
Conventional  February 2001  February 2012  4.875%   
 
TIPS  July 2002  July 2012  3.000%  179.80000 
Conventional  August 2002  August 2012  4.375%       
 
* In the case of this security the actual issuance date was delayed up to three weeks.  
The dates listed then correspond to the dating of the security for purposes of the reference  
CPI and coupon and principal payments. Source: Bureau of Public Debt Online.  21
   
TABLE 4 
After-Tax Nominal Yields on TIPS and Matched Conventional Fixed-Rate Securities*   
 
 Conventional     Conventional 
     Treasury         Treasury 
TIPS Maturity      Maturity  Expected  TIPS After-Tax    After-Tax  
(Coupon rate)  (Coupon Rate)  Inflation  Nominal Yield  Nominal Yield   
January 2007  October 2006  3.125%  2.96%  1.60% 
 (3.375%)    (6.500%)   
 
January 2008  February 2008  1.875%  2.40%  2.14% 
 (3.625%)    (5.500%) 
 
January 2009  May 2009  1.625%  2.32%  2.22% 
 (3.875%)    (5.50%) 
 
January 2010  February 2010  2.250%  2.82%  2.42% 
 (4.25%)    (6.50%) 
 
January 2011  February 2011  1.500%  2.52%  2.66% 
 (3.50%)    (5.00%) 
 
January 2012  February 2012  1.500%  2.54%  2.76% 
 (3.375%)    (4.875%) 
 
July 2012  August 2012  1.375%  2.56%  2.86% 
 (3.00%)    4.375%) 
 
April 2028  August 2028  1.875%  3.10%  3.46% 
 (3.625%)    (5.50%) 
 
April 2029  February 2029  1.375%  2.72%  3.48% 
 (3.875%)    (5.25%) 
 
April 2032  February 2031  2.000%  3.16%  3.34% 
 (3.375%)    (5.375%) 
         
* All calculations use equations (4) or (5) and assume a marginal ordinary income tax rate of 
34% and a capital gains tax rate of 20%. Inflation is estimated as the difference between the FR 
coupon rate and the TIPS coupon rate, and assumed to remain constant for the life of the TIPS. 
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TABLE 5 
Inflation Rate that Equates After-Tax Yield on TIPS with After-Tax Yield on Fixed Rate 
Securities*     
 
 Conventional 
      Treasury 
TIPS Maturity       Maturity  After-tax Nominal  Inflation 
(Coupon rate)    (Coupon Rate)    Yield on Both    Rate     
 
January 2007   October 2006  1.60%  1.12% 
  (3.375%)    (6.500%) 
 
January 2008  February 2008  2.14%  1.50% 
  (3.625%)    (5.500%) 
 
January 2009  May 2009  2.22%  1.46% 
  (3.87%)    (5.50%) 
 
January 2010  February 2010  2.42%  1.67% 
  (4.25%)    (6.50%) 
 
January 2011  February 2011  2.66%  1.72% 
  (3.50%)    (5.00%) 
 
January 2012  February 2012  2.76%  1.83% 
  (3.375%)    (4.875%) 
 
July 2012  August 2012  2.86%  1.83% 
  (3.00%)    (4.375%) 
 
April 2028  August 2028  3.46%  2.39% 
  (3.625%)    (5.50%) 
 
April 2029  February 2029  3.48%  2.47% 
  (3.875%)    (5.25%) 
 
April 2032  February 2031  3.34%  2.26% 
  (3.375%)    (5.375%) 
   
* All calculations use equations (4) or (5) and assume a marginal ordinary income tax rate of 
34% and a capital gains tax rate of 20%. The ￿critical inflation rate￿ is the inflation rate at which 
the after-tax nominal yield on the TIPS will equal the after-tax nominal yield on the matched 
fixed-rate Treasury security.  Inflation rates above (below) this critical rate would result in the 
TIPS having a higher (lower) after-tax nominal yield. 
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TABLE 6 
Annual After-Tax Holding Period Returns (HPR, as of January 15, 2003 for the TIPS and 
February 14, 2003 for the conventional Treasury securities) for the Four Maturity-Date-Matched 
Pairs Maturing in January or February   
TIPS  Issuance Maturity  Approximate  TIPS  After- Conventional 
   Year    Holding  Tax HPR    After-Tax 
FR Issuance       Period          HPR   
 
January 1998  2008  5 Years  5.84%  5.04% 
February 1998 
 
January 2000  2010  3 Years  9.08%  8.34% 
February 2000 
 
January 2001  2011  2 Years  8.22%  6.58% 
February 2001 
 
January 2002  2012  1 Year  12.52%  8.68% 
February 2002 